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Abstract. ‘Autonomous technologies’ refers to systems that make decisions without explicit human control or interaction. This conceptual paper explores the notion of autonomy by first exploring human autonomy, and then using this understanding to analyze
how autonomous technology could or should be modelled. First, we discuss what human autonomy means. We conclude that it is the overall space for action—rather than
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the degree of control—and the actual choices, or number of choices, that constitutes
human autonomy. Based on this, our second discussion leads us to suggest the term datanomous to denote technology that builds on, and is restricted by, its own data when
operating autonomously. Our conceptual exploration brings forth a more precise definition of human autonomy and datanomous systems. Finally, we conclude this exploration by suggesting that human autonomy can be strengthened by datanomous
technologies, but only if they support the human space for action. It is the purpose of
human activity that determines if technology strengthens or weakens human autonomy.
Key words: human autonomy, machine autonomy, datanomous technology, robots, smart
insulin pump, artificial intelligence, philosophy of technology, situated abilities.

1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies “combined with automation have vast implications for organizing work and for supporting everyday life activities, but can also challenge human control” (Vassilakopoulou et al., n.d.). AI technologies make decisions
and perform operations based on data-driven inferences, learning, or even self-improving (Dignum, 2018; McCarthy et al., 2006; Russell & Norvig, 1995) by gathering
more data and modifying their algorithms. Today, AI technology is an integrated part
of many digital systems and products, increasing their decision-making capacities (Xu,
2021). AI systems can make decisions based on data without any explicit interaction
with a human.
In their synthesis of “Good AI principles” Floridi et al. (2018) present five basic
principles, one of which is human autonomy. Similarly, Formosa (2021) argues that
autonomy is a basic ethical principle. Floridi et al. (2018) refer to the Montreal Declaration for a Responsible Development of AI (2018), which states that “development of
AI should promote the autonomy of all human beings and control … the autonomy
of computer systems”. Floridi et al. (2018) continues: “The EGE [European Group on
Ethics in Science and New Technologies (2018)] argues that autonomous systems ‘must
not impair [the] freedom of human beings to set their own standards and norms and
be able to live according to them’” (p. 698). In this paper we explore how these ethical
principles are present in real life, i.e., we assess how autonomous technologies support
or reduce human autonomy.
Autonomous systems can be defined as “systems which are capable of acting upon
the world independently of real-time human control” (Soltanzadeh, 2021, p. 1; Xu,
2021). Autonomous technology can act as “tools for enhancing ‘human agency, without removing human responsibility’” (Vassilakopoulou et al., n.d.). In other words,
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autonomous systems can have an impact on human autonomy. We are asking, in particular, whether increased system autonomy leads to a decrease in human autonomy,
in a zero-sum case, or if increased system autonomy also can increase and strengthen
human autonomy (Formosa, 2021; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000).
Questions about the relation between autonomous technology and human autonomy can be addressed in different ways. In this paper, we offer a conceptual discussion of
the notion of autonomy. Strengthening human autonomy has been a long-lasting goal
for IT development in Scandinavia (e.g., Langefors, 1980; Nygaard, 1996; Simonsen &
Robertson, 2013) and elsewhere (Briefs et al., 1983; Soltanzadeh, 2021; Weizenbaum,
1976; Winograd & Flores, 1986). “Respecting others’ autonomy is an important moral
principle ... and is regarded as an important value in the design of autonomous systems”
(Soltanzadeh, 2021: 16).
However, when the notion of autonomy is used to refer to technology, the meaning
of the word changes (Nyholm, 2018; Purves et al., 2015).
The suitability of the term ‘autonomous’ to refer to technical systems can of
course be questioned. This is because current machines are not autonomous in
the sense in which the term is used in moral philosophy; i.e., they do not have
the capacity to reflect on and understand reasons for actions and cannot be held
morally or legally responsible for their impacts on their surroundings (Soltanzadeh, 2021, p. 1).
As the number of autonomous systems increases in all areas of society, it seems appropriate to discuss what we mean by the term and how these technologies affect human
autonomy. We argue that the terminology currently used to denote autonomous technologies should be more nuanced and precise, in order to create realistic expectations
for what the technology can and cannot do.
The paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the concept of autonomy; section 2 looks into human autonomy while section 3 explores autonomous technology. In section 4 we discuss the differences between automation and autonomy. We
rethink machine autonomy and suggest the notion of datanomous technology as a more
precise term. In section 5 we discuss if and how human autonomy can be strengthened
by datanomous technology. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Human autonomy
Understood in a broad sense, autonomy is “an equivalent of liberty” (Dworkin, 1988).
The concept encompasses meanings such as “self-rule or sovereignty”, but autonomy
can also be considered as synonymous with “freedom of the will.” Originally autonomy
was conceptualised as an individual’s capability to abide by self-imposed moral laws
(Schmidt & Kraemer, 2006); the word itself stems from the Greek words for ‘self ’
(auto) and ‘law’ (nomos), and can be directly translated to ‘self-law’. Historically, the
idea of autonomy has been tightly linked to personhood and morality. For instance,
autonomy was central to Kant’s conception of morality in that people are self-governing
because they are autonomous. The understanding of morality as self-governance meant
that each individual may rightly claim direction over her or his own actions “without
interference from the state, the church, the neighbours, or those claiming to be better
or wiser than we are.” (Schneewind 1998, p. 5). In other words, individuals themselves
legislate the moral law.
While morality previously was conceptualised as obedience, it changed by the end
of the 18th century to be seen as self-governance, a view centred around the belief
that “all normal individuals are equally able to live together in a morality of self-governance” (Schneewind, 1998, p. 4). The normative belief in the dignity and worth of
the individual is the root of the more modern conception of morality as self-governance. Common characteristics of autonomy include dignity, integrity, individuality,
independence, responsibility, and self-knowledge (Dworkin, 1988). The experience of
respect, dignity, and equality are some of the reasons for autonomy to be valued, for
example in the feeling of independence for older people still being able to live on their
own in their own homes, or for young people to manage the duties of an adult citizen,
paying taxes and rent. Autonomy is personal but not necessarily limited to the person,
as we discuss below.

2.1 Individual autonomy is relational and situated
The individualistic view of autonomy, describing a rational man who makes his own
decisions influenced by no one, has been criticized for taking an individual’s circumstances and contexts for granted (Dworkin, 1988; Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000; Mol,
2008)—particularly the support from others. MacKenzie and Stoljar (2000) introduce
relational autonomy to denote a range of perspectives sharing the view that humans are
socially embedded. A relational understanding of autonomy includes the social context that makes individual autonomy possible. In this relational sense, autonomy is an
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emerging property of the situation and circumstances of an individual, where his or her
autonomy is encouraged or hampered by these circumstances.
People do not live in isolation but are always socially embedded, so individual humans will always be reliant on the world around them (Schmidt & Kraemer, 2006).
Schmidt and Kraemer (2006) point to the paradox that autonomy requires social interdependence. A person’s autonomy is better understood in the larger context of human
social relations and interdependencies. Code (2004, p. 196) argues that an individualistic understanding of autonomy “glosses over the extent to which autonomous man
himself is dependent on patterns of invisible advocacy” and suggests that advocacy
relations are a prerequisite for autonomy (Pearsall, 1999). The notion of advocacy relations can be used to characterize a person’s autonomy as one of two (Verne, 2014,
2020). The first type is an environment that supports Do-It-Yourself (DIY) autonomy
by helping the individual carry out an action. The second type supports a kind of autonomy Verne calls “duke autonomy”, wherein the individuals cannot or will not do the
action themselves, but get somebody else to do it for them. Powerful individuals have
always received support, services, and help from others in ways that do not diminish
their powers or autonomy.
People might experience different and varying degrees of autonomy in different situations and contexts. The situatedness of autonomy refers to how a person is always in a
situation. One of Heideggers neologisms, Befindlichkeit was formed from German sich
befinden (meaning “existing or finding oneself in a situation”) (Ciborra & Willcocks,
2006). The situatedness of any being emerges from our living in situations or contexts
(Gendlin, 1978). The notion refers to how a person finds himself living in a situation,
and how that situation always belongs to someone (Saplacan, 2020). Understanding
human autonomy as situated enables us to see the individual human as an integrated
part of his or her environment and, vice versa, the environment as a support for human autonomy. It is the situated, contextual human who acts autonomously with the
support present in the situation, as well as his or her abilities. The notion of ‘situated
abilities’ has been suggested as a way of emphasizing how both the context and abilities
of a person affect his or her autonomy. Hence, the autonomy may vary over time and
from one situation to the next (Saplacan, 2020). The experience of autonomy may be
strengthened or weakened depending on the situation.
A relational understanding of human autonomy also includes the technologies used
in the situation, ranging from common tools like glasses and canes to complex, advanced ones. Technologies that act without human command can also be understood as
constituting part of a human’s environment, encouraging or hampering individual autonomy. When using autonomous technology, humans may negotiate and re-negotiate
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL),167
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their autonomy depending on the autonomy that the technology is designed to have.
An example is “distributed cognition” (Hutchins, 2006; Säljö, 2001), which describes
how humans design their environment to increase their capabilities by distributing
tasks to, for example, a calculator (delegated the task of calculating) or a mobile phone
(delegated to remember things or keep the time). Some phenomenological approaches
also emphasize how we see our environment and arrange it to enhance our capabilities,
e.g., how an elderly woman with mobility problems arranges objects in her home to
make everyday activities easier (Brereton, 2013).

2.2 Autonomy is about space for action
Another central aspect of autonomy is the ability to decide for oneself and make one’s
own choices (Dworkin, 1988). Many decisions are made with little or no deliberation,
like habits or automatic actions (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; Schütz, 1951). Other decisions are made after reflection, concluding a process of deliberation. Making decisions
in all areas of life is part of being human, and for “anyone who lives in the real world,
making choices is very much part of what makes them who they are” (Harper et al.,
2017, p. 234). Making a choice implies deciding upon one of two or more possibilities
(or abstaining from choosing any of them), i.e., a decision limited by a set of alternatives. When faced with an overwhelming number of choices, humans may experience
decision paralysis (Anderson, 2003) and delayed or impaired decision-making, even if
the outcome is of little consequence. Yet, the number of possibilities will always—to
some degree—be limited by the environment, that is to say, a situation in which both
humans and technologies contribute to opening up possibilities, as well as delimiting
the range of options. Cohen et al. (1972) suggest that organizational decision-making
depends on the participants and the problems and solutions they bring to the situation.
The meeting between these elements delimits the range of available possibilities that can
be chosen and acted upon, i.e., what can be decided.
Decision-making and a feeling of autonomy go hand-in-hand, because autonomy
entails a certain authority over one’s own decision-making (Dworkin, 1988). Autonomous humans decide what to do based on their own preferences in a situation, and this
does not take place in a vacuum (Floridi et al., 2018). Basically, the autonomous human
needs to have the ability to utilize the support in a situation, e.g., be able to make use
of available technology. Here we focus on the decision-making and on making the right
choice rather than the user’s ability to utilize the technology.
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Floridi et al. (2018, p. 698) argue that a “human should always retain the power
to decide which decisions to take”. Formosa (2021) suggests that autonomy presupposes
“adequacy of options,” that our autonomy increases when “we are given more control
over important aspects of our lives and access to a diverse range of meaningful choices”
(Formosa, 2021, p. 598). Hence, making a choice depends on the ability concerning the
possibilities for action that are open or closed, supported or hampered, in a situation.
This ability includes knowledge about the resources provided by the environment that
limit and open up these possibilities. More importantly, this ability also includes the
power and knowledge to influence the number and range of possibilities, and to suggest
better alternatives than those originally presented. Every situation is in some ways different from all other situations and in this sense not fully predictable (Suchman, 1987).
New possibilities may emerge in a situation where the resources can support new types
of actions or new ways of interpreting the situation and the choices it offers. The ability
needed for making decisions and acting in new situations, therefore, builds both on experience from normal situations and routines (Bainbridge, 1983; SAE, n.d.; Xu, 2021)
and on the ability to imagine new situations or interpret the situation and its elements
in new ways (Mills, 1967; Schütz, 1951).
Formosa (2021) discusses three ways in which human autonomy can be increased:
1) by being able to choose “more valuable ends” or gaining “access to a greater number
of valuable ends or to ends that are more valuable” (p. 603) suggesting that it is the
space of possibilities that is important for human autonomy, 2) by offering “improved
autonomy competencies” through being able to focus on “build, maintain, and develop
their autonomy competencies” (p. 604) emphasizing that developing new possibilities
in a situation is essential, and 3) by enabling “more authentic choices, both in the sense
of more choices that are authentic and choices that are more authentic.” (p. 604). It is not
the number of choices itself, but the range of possibilities offered that constitutes the
space for action of a human.
We suggest the term space for action to refer to the full range of possibilities for action available to a human in a situation. The space for action is situated and can never
be fully predictable. In addition to the characteristics of the situation and context, it
builds on a person’s abilities and imagination. An example from fieldwork in a hospital
can illustrate the difference between an expert and a novice (Bratteteig, 2004; Goodwin, 1994). The authors followed the nurses as they were doing their work. After a
morning round with the doctors, the nurses asked whether the researchers noticed how
they lifted the patients’ ankles and patted them on the leg. The nurses explained that
looking at and feeling the ankles is a way to check if the heart functions well. What the
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researchers had interpreted as care for their patients was in fact a professional evaluation
of the patients’ condition.
The human space for action is, in other words, characterized by the ability to redefine a situation. When changing or adding perspectives, a person may understand
the currently available information in new ways. In turn, this introduces a new set of
possibilities for action, alternative to those originally available. The quantitative change
in the choices available is trivial, as it is the qualitative nature of the new set of actions
that redefines the situation. A good example of this is the story about Odysseus, who
voluntarily agreed to give up his autonomy and be tied to the mast, so he would be able
to withstand the sirens’ song. In the story, Odysseus redefines the situation from it is
not possible to listen to the sirens’ song without suffering the consequences of its enchantment,
which is certain death to it is possible to listen to the siren song, as long as I am prepared to
withstand the suffering of being tied to the mast. In allowing himself to be tied up, he temporarily loses all autonomy but does so precisely in the pursuit of gaining autonomy.
This illustrates how the space for action has a variable horizon that can be extended or
constrained, depending on what the situation calls for.
A relational and situational perspective on human autonomy emphasizes that autonomy as a concept cannot be understood as a dichotomy. We cannot say that an
individual is either autonomous or not; her or his autonomy will vary with the characteristics of the situation (Mackenzie & Stoljar, 2000). Self-driving cars can illustrate
this point. For a person with impaired vision a self-driving car will be of assistance in
running errands or traveling places, without relying on the help and kindness of family
and friends. This can give the visually-impaired person more autonomy. On the other
hand, an experienced driver, who enjoys operating an ordinary (non-self driving) car
may experience her autonomy as limited or constrained in a self-driving car. The pleasure of being the one in control of the vehicle—such as pushing the limits of the car by
speeding and changing gears—is taken away from the driver with this technology, and
she would be more like a passenger under the control of the car. Therefore, the same
type of technology may be experienced in different ways. A self-driving vehicle has the
potential to both weaken and strengthen human autonomy depending on the vastly
different circumstances of the potential driver (or passenger).

3 Autonomous technology
It is generally accepted that, in delegating a work task to autonomous technology,
humans are relieved from, for instance, tedious, repetitive, or dangerous work. Technology is commonly considered as autonomous when it appears to make decisions
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independently of human intervention, that is to say, without explicit human control
or interaction. In more precise terms, a machine is autonomous when it is capable of
following “a complex algorithm in response to environmental inputs, independently of
real-time human input.” (Formosa, 2021, p. 599). In other words, autonomous technology makes decisions on its own and its decisions can later be changed based on the
gathering and processing of new data.
A central issue for the development of responsible AI (and autonomous technologies) is the question of what it actually means for an AI system to make a decision,
and whether or not such a system can be held accountable for its decisions and actions
(Dignum, 2018). Soltanzadeh (2021, p. 1) contends that autonomous systems “cannot
be held morally or legally responsible for their impacts on their surroundings.”
Furthermore, Bradshaw et al. (2013) criticise the common view of autonomous
technology differentiating between levels of machine autonomy (Cummings, 2004;
Parasuraman et al., 2000; SAE, n.d.) and argue that the concept autonomy refers to different phenomena. They particularly discuss self-sufficiency and self-directedness, i.e.,
both “the capability of an entity to take care of itself ” and its “freedom from outside
control” (Bradshaw et al., 2013, p. 54). Both self-directedness and self-sufficiency are
needed for a technology to act autonomously.

3.1 Seemingly autonomous behavior
“[E]ven the simplest machine can seem to function ‘autonomously’ if the task and
context are sufficiently constrained” (Bradshaw et al. 2013, p. 57). For instance, the
thermostat exercises “an admirable degree of self-sufficiency and self-directedness with
respect to the limited tasks it’s designed to perform through the use of a simple form
of automation” (Bradshaw et al 2013, p. 57). A thermostat regulates the temperature
automatically. A smart building that regulates the temperature autonomously to save
energy is based on a complicated balancing of various types of data—possibly including
that of a thermostat. The building’s computer may decide not to adjust a low indoor
temperature should other data, e.g., date or time of day, be given higher priority in the
calculation.
Knowing both how the smart building’s sensors are set up and also its energy-saving
model makes it possible to understand how it operates. However, this is not the case
with all autonomous technologies, even everyday and mundane technologies like robot
vacuum cleaners. A machine’s self-sufficiency will in most cases be relative both to a set
of pre-defined goals and tasks as well as a set of fixed ones. This means that even when
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a system functions well and operates immaculately without human supervision, it all
happens within the limited circumstances of its abilities (Bradshaw et al. 2013).
Take robotic vacuum cleaners as an illustration. When turned on, a vacuum cleaner
robot moves forward and collects dust and small things from the floor on its way1. Sensors detect obstacles it has to climb. The robot is unable to differentiate between a chair,
a foot, or a ledge, and thus cannot have a variety of strategies for how to deal with such
an array of challenges. Whenever a obstacle is detected, the robot backs up a few inches,
turns itself some degrees to the side before continuing forward, collecting dust until the
next hindrance is met. In this way, the robot covers the ground through a seemingly
unpredictable series of movements. When its power gets low, the robot returns to its
charging station, which is equipped with sensors that the robot can detect. Some vacuum cleaner robots use an infrared sensor to create a map of the navigated environment.
Such maps are made available for the user on a corresponding smartphone app. Other
than the app, a user has little control of the robot during its operation, other than turning it on or off. Its movements may also be manipulated by positioning an obstacle in
front of it (e.g., a foot) to force a change in direction.
Empirical studies of robot vacuum cleaners show that the robot takes over some
work tasks, but also requires extra work from human users. Even a simple task like vacuum cleaning, delegated to a robot does not make the work disappear; it just changes
the overall activity (Bradshaw et al., 2013). Robots in the wild (i.e., natural or human
environments not specifically designed for robots) require humans to arrange the environment so that it fits the robot’s requirements for performing its tasks autonomously
(Forlizzi & DiSalvo, 2006; Verne, 2020). For example, many users report that they
continuously move furniture around in their homes. The various kinds of facilitation
work required to enable a domestic robot to carry out its task autonomously can be
described as pre, peri, and post-facilitation work (Soma et al., 2018), and comes in
addition to the initial setup of the robot. Pre-facilitation includes removing things lying on the floor or moving furniture around. Peri-facilitation is carried out while the
robot is operating, e.g., helping it when it becomes stuck in cables, curtains, or items
users forgot to remove before the robot started. Post-facilitation takes place whenever
people make permanent changes to their homes to relieve themselves from pre and
peri-facilitation (Soma et al., 2018). Of course, we normally also do facilitation work
before cleaning, whether we do it ourselves or hire a cleaning service. Although the
basic task of tidying before human or robotic cleaning assistance may look identical
from the outside, they are very different in terms of intentionality and outcome. In the
unfortunate event that you have forgotten to tidy a room or forgotten to pick items up
from the floor, the housekeeper is able to do this work for you or downright refuse work
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under such conditions. They will not, however, use the vacuum cleaner and tangle it in
the things you missed or forgot to tidy. In contrast, the chances of a vacuum cleaning
robot successfully performing its task without proper facilitation work is slim, because
it is unable to differentiate between obstacles.
Even if users carry out facilitation work before, during, and after the robot operates,
many still conceive the robot as autonomous. Our studies indicate that the fact that it
moves around based on its internal decision-making—avoiding obstacles and operating
without direct human command—is what makes many people ascribe autonomy even
to this type of simple robot (Soma, 2020). Merely collecting dust is automated by the
robot. Hence, the robot vacuum cleaner is a simple automaton, and in this sense comparable to a washing machine. However, it is not trivial that the internal decision-making process of these robots—where to go, when to stop and turn or not turn—is opaque
to the user. Autonomous movements through physical and social space are easily interpreted as the robot having the capacity to act, react, and even adapt to its environment
(Bianchini et al., 2016). It is the way it goes about doing it, moving by itself, that makes
us attribute reason and agency to the robot. In other words, it is disguised as an autonomous technology, moving around on its own, following a self-devised plan for how to
best ensure clean floors, without human command.
This suggests that the vacuum cleaner robot can only be seen as autonomous if we
focus on the technical artefact in isolation, viewing autonomy as a property or feature
of the technical artefact itself, ignoring the facilitation work that is performed around
it (Soltanzadeh, 2021).

3.2 Autonomy or automation?
The autonomy of technology is difficult to identify as it is often confused with automation (Xu, 2021). The concepts ‘automation’ and ‘autonomous technology’ are often used interchangeably, but they refer to different technical capabilities. Automation
means that the performance of a task is delegated to a machine, like washing clothes in
a washing machine. Simple automatic machines such as washing machines or ATMs
present a set of choices to the user. However, there are also automatic machines that
operate without presenting information or choices to the user after deployment, during
operation, e.g., a pacemaker. Human decision-making and control depend on being
presented the information that the decision is based on and being able to make the
decision oneself. Autonomous technology does not offer this possibility, and its control
has to be achieved in different ways, such as when you stop the robot vacuum cleaner by
putting a foot in its way so that it turns around. When it comes to autonomous systems,
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the initial technical premise upon which the user decided to take the system into use
changes over time, during its operation.
Above, we discussed whether the robot vacuum cleaner is in fact better understood
by the notion of automation, because the only decisions it makes are tied to how it
physically covers the surface area of a given space and turn when it detects an obstacle.
We suggested that its movements seem meaningful to a human observer, making the
technology appear autonomous. There is not just an absence of human command; there
is also a certain lack of interaction.
Lack of conscious interaction from the human side in operating automatic technology is quite common, e.g., automatic door opener. However, such “implicit interaction” (Ju & Leifer, 2008) does not distinguish between an autonomous and an
automatic system, in which the system’s data gathering detects human action that can
be interpreted as a command, e.g., approaching an automatic door and get registered by
the sensor, which is interpreted as a command to open the door. Ju and Leifer (2008)
give an example of a high level of implicit interaction. A friend sends a link to a funny
animation online, but your computer needs to install a plug-in for you to view it. According to the authors, this plug-in can be installed in several ways. The highest level of
implicit interaction is described in this way:
Our Web browser anticipated that we might want to play a Flash animation
someday, and already has downloaded and installed the plug-in. … This … case
is the most implicit interaction. In fact, with so much presumption and so little
visibility, this … interaction may hardly be considered an interaction at all, since
there is no activity or awareness on our part. … [I]t is more accurate to speak of
interactions being more and less implicit. (Ju & Leifer, 2008, p. 77).
Ju and Leifer characterize this interaction as proactive, which means the technology
takes the initiative. In addition, it operates in the background, requiring no attention
from the human user. This example allows us to distinguish between automatic and
autonomous computer actions. The former merely install an update of software on a
user’s computer, while the latter initializes the search for new software by itself—new
software that the user might use in the future but has not yet used, and never asked for.
Machine Learning (ML) adds to the complexity by integrating new data into its basis
for decisions, and the original rationale is replaced by machine logic after some time
(Holmquist, 2017) making the decisions less transparent and, in turn, more difficult to
control. Autonomous technology makes decisions based on data it has collected. These
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data—and decisions previously made upon them—is used to modify its model of the
world.

3.3 AI in autonomous systems
In the start of this section we quoted Formosa (2021)’s definition of machine autonomy. Formosa continues by saying that “[m]ore advanced forms of machine autonomy
typically depend upon the use of AI” (Formosa, 2021, p. 599). AI makes decisions and
performs operations based on data-driven inferences, such as rules (e.g., chess rules
applied to decide on the next best move) or statistical calculations (e.g., a spell checker
that suggests the word you most probably are trying to type) (Holmquist, 2017). ML
learns from the new data it gets exposed to and improves its decisions over time.
An example of a simple AI-based autonomous technology is a smart insulin pump
which constantly and automatically measures glucose levels and administers insulin in
micro-doses throughout the day. In a study of how a smart pump is used in real life
we learn about Lisa, who recently shifted to a smart insulin pump2. The smart pump
replaces—and eliminates—previously needed equipment such as the blood glucose meters used to determine the proper insulin dose and the syringe or pen used to inject the
insulin manually. The smart pump includes a constant glucose monitor (CGM) sensor
that feeds a computer with measurement data, which in turn automatically controls the
dosage and distribution of microdoses of base insulin. In other words, it is ‘smart’ in the
same sense as a ‘smart’ building. It combines specific data concerning blood sugar levels
and calculates the right insulin dosage.
Injecting a wrong dose of insulin will cause the patient to become unwell, and
both underdosing or overdosing the amount of insulin injected may be life-threatening. When well trained, a smart insulin pump is less error-prone than insulin delivery
by humans. Thus, the smart pump is an example of a medical technology that makes
a complicated but life-saving treatment easier to deal with on a daily basis. However,
due to the highly individual differences between each diabetic patient, a new smart
pump does not work right out of the box. Instead it has to learn from the daily life
and routines of its user in order to adapt its algorithms for automatically distribute the
right dosages in the right situations. The setup procedure for Lisa’s new device and its
learning process made it necessary for her to clear out her work schedule, travel plans,
and other appointments, while calibrating the device to her body specifically. Should
she radically change her life style, she would need to recalibrate the pump.
In Lisa’s case, the autonomous pump has reduced her control of the insulin administration compared to her previous manual pump. Blood glucose levels are measured
Published by AIS Electronic Library (AISeL),175
2022

Soma et al.:
Strengthening Human Autonomy

13

© Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, 2022 34(2), 163-198

Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Vol. 34 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 5

continuously, but the insulin dose response will always be after-the-fact, after a rise in
the glucose level. In this regard, a smart insulin pump is better at imitating the self-regulating hormonal feedback-loop in a healthy and fully functioning pancreas, similarly
to how a pacemaker imitates the beat of a healthy heart.
The level of control constitutes one of the main differences between the two generations of pumps. Lisa cannot herself add contextual factors that would alter the insulin
supply. She does not fully understand how the pump works, and neither does her diabetes nurse. They have to trust the pump’s calculations, and the trust is based on the
experience of living with the pump. To maintain trust in the pump Lisa has to ‘behave
correctly’. Her control of the pump lies in her adherence to the model of glucose-level
control that the pump uses to process its data and build its decisions on.
The smart insulin pump is an example of a technology that is equipped with a ML
algorithm specifically developed for a limited purpose, namely to make it easier for
diabetes patients to deal with their condition, hopefully enhancing their overall quality
of life. The pump constantly learns from the data it collects and modifies the insulin
doses to be better tailored to the individual, so its learning is limited to the individual
to which it is attached, and its autonomous decisions are thus contained within a very
limited system.

4 Rethinking machine autonomy: Datanomous
machines
As a result of the constraints on our thinking with inadequate language, many misconceptions arise as to what an autonomous technology is, can, or should be. As we have
explained above, the concept of autonomy has deep roots in moral thought. Keeping
these roots in mind, autonomy implies that an entity described as autonomous has a
right to, or possesses a capability for, self-governing. Still, it seems that the concept’s
deep roots in moral thought are no longer prevailing, as autonomy usually refers to
independence in modern dictionaries. Thus, it has gained a far more functional meaning in the vernacular use of the word. In everyday language, autonomy is used as an
adjective, as a characterization or dimension of being, rather than a state of being that
contains a multitude of dimensions.
According to Luck et al. (2003) an autonomous agent is an entity that is able to
generate its own goals. Still, the authors accentuate that autonomy as a concept is “one
of the most used but least operationalized words in the fields of intelligent agents and
multi-agent systems” (Luck et al., 2003, p. 9). It is common to use autonomy as a characterization of a type of technology, usually expressed through neat levels that easily
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sort the autonomous from the regular systems. Such views have been criticized for their
descriptions of autonomy and automation as being one-dimensional, a misconception
which is not just damaging in its own right, but can, through its continued propagation, lead to serious consequences (Bradshaw et al., 2013).
The current use of autonomy in these fields might therefore be considered a misnomer. The currently functional meaning of the term, combined with the lack of operationalization, leads to a confusion of what the notion contains. Therefore, Schmidt and
Kraemer (2006) suggest that it might be fruitful to reintroduce the original, humanistic
meaning of autonomy.
In a Heideggerian transcendentalist view, language is understood as a condition for
the possibility of thinking (Coeckelbergh, 2017). While neither language nor technology determine us, per se, the language used to conceptualize technology—both novel,
well-established, and fully integrated—might provide unintended constraints on our
thinking, constraints of which we are usually unaware. The roles of language and technology as mediators mean they shape our way of thinking. Thus they also shape our actions by framing our understanding of the world in a certain way. Heidegger’s approach
to overcoming the inadequacy of language to properly describe the phenomena he was
interested in examining, was to create new words. This enabled him to understand the
world and technology in new ways. Inspired by Heidegger’s strategy we wish to introduce a new term that reframes the way autonomous technology is conceptualized. Our
hope is that this new term will reshape how autonomous technology is understood, not
just within research but also for users of this technology.
As mentioned above, autonomous systems depend on data to function properly.
Data is perhaps best understood as an indicator or representation of a phenomenon,
like fever indicates illness. In modern dictionaries, data usually denotes representations
of items of information in the form of sets of values or variables, collected together
for reference, analysis, or calculation. This definition rightfully indicates that data is
purposefully curated, and intended to assist in identifying the meaning represented by
the values. In other words, data is designed (Feinberg et al., 2017; Muller et al., 2019).
Studies concerning the work practice of data scientists show that “data is produced by
techniques of measurement that are imbued with judgements and values that dictate
what is counted and what is not” (Pine & Liboiron, 2015). Further, data come into
existence as given; as captured; as curated; as designed, and as created (Muller et al.,
2019, p. 1) with increasing levels of intervention by data scientists. This practice of data
wrangling filters out dirty data that do not fit, which in turn indicate that the system
that uses this data influences “the kind of data that [can] be represented” (Muller et al.
2019, p. 3). In other words: “Raw data is an oxymoron” (Gitelman, 2013).
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When new data is collected, the original model of an autonomous system will become more precise in representing the world according to its specific data types. Collecting and integrating more data in the basis for decisions is the system’s way of expanding
its space for action. For instance, Lisa’s smart pump becomes more precise in giving
more adjusted dosages of insulin the more it knows about Lisa and her glucose and
insulin balance, because this can be measured and represented as data. An automaton
operates on a model with data that does not change its range of actions. Autonomous
systems can change their range of actions when more and new data is integrated and
when decisions change due to new data processing. Lisa’s smart pump is an example of
this, using data to analyze patterns of glucose and insulin levels over time. These data
make up the basis for adjusting the insulin dosage at the right time. Similarly, a smart
building regulates the temperature, and electricity, based on various measurements as
well as information about time of day, weekday, season, and so on.
The insulin pump is a computer system that makes inferences based on the data it
is able to collect and the calculations it is able to do. The system does not know anything about the phenomena it measures or the operations it performs. Just like a robot
vacuum cleaner does not know anything about dust, the insulin pump does not know
anything about blood or insulin. As humans we can make sense of the data, e.g., that a
piece of cake will change the glucose level, or judge whether a thing on the floor is dust
or something we want to keep. The systems’ performance, or their space for action, is
limited by the data they can collect because data constitute the basis for the decisions
the systems make.
As all smart insulin pumps are tailored to individual patients, they are all different.
Further, it is smart only within a closed system, similar to a thermostat. The pump expands its possibilities within the closed system and can develop many more possibilities
than a human in that space—similar to a chess computer that reasons differently than
a human within the limits of the game (Holmquist, 2017).
The robot vacuum cleaner acts on its data by turning when it senses an obstacle; it
does not matter what the qualities of the obstacle are, e.g., whether it is big or small,
soft or hard, blue or yellow. An obstacle is an obstacle. The smart pump can change the
insulin dosage based on its input and its calculations, but its actions are still limited by
the data it can register and what it can process. Literature on ML often refers to playing
Go and chess. The computer has implemented the rules only, and finds ways to play by
itself. It creates its own decision logic (Holmquist, 2017). This is possible because both
Go and chess are closed areas, different from many other real world activities—like
vacuum cleaning and diabetes management, in which the data limits the context. We
have argued that both the robot vacuum cleaner and the smart insulin pump operate
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in ways that show their limits compared to human perception of data. While the robot
vacuum cleaner operates with a stable and very limited set of data in its world, the smart
pump learns from new data in ways that modify its set of data and hence its decisions.
It behaves autonomously.
However, both systems operate on pre-defined types of data based on human categories. The data types are limited; the types close the system. Even an AI-based technology
that learns from new data can only act on the data types on which it has been trained.
Understanding the data—and the types of data—is therefore crucial for understanding
these technologies. Data is what the sensors or other data gathering equipment are able
to register, i.e., data is a result of processed input, and a product of design. This production of data has to happen before it is possible to compile and process the data. Thus,
data is always historical. Only pre-defined types of data will be collected or taken as
input, which makes it difficult for data-driven technologies to adjust to new situations
(Broussard, 2018). Therefore, the particularities of a situation will not be accounted for,
unless they are part of the pre-defined data set.
Computers use data as input for their algorithms to operate. Hence, it is the data
that governs the technology’s decisions and behavior. It is therefore difficult—even impossible—for a computer to increase its space for action beyond the pre-defined data
categories and algorithms unless it operates in a closed area like chess or Go (Holmquist, 2017), whereby the ML technology can alter its algorithms within the limits of
the game. Any space for action created by data types and algorithms can be seen as a
model. It is not changed (expanded or constrained) even when more data is added and
used to make slightly different decisions. The decisions are still limited to the modeled
space, because data is still of the same specific type. Adding more data will contribute to
increasing the detail and granularity of the modelled space, but it does not contribute
to its redefinition.
In contrast to the autonomous human, autonomous technologies do not have situational awareness. When they are developed, they are equipped with a model of the
world that is compatible with the desired or available data types. Any and all operations
of these systems will be limited to the world-view offered by its specific data set. In turn,
all its decisions will be driven by registered data, i.e., the data is historical. This data is
either the input that it has been fed by human trainers, or retrieved itself in its interactions with its environment. While such systems will operate in many situations without
human intervention, these technologies are unable to adapt and operate independently
should the situation change.
It is obvious that there is an inherent difference between what we consider to be human autonomy and the limited operations of autonomous systems. We argue that there
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is a need to make these differences explicit, and bring forward a new and more precise
concept to assist this process: datanomous technology.
As a term, datanomy (and datanomous) suggests that the operations of these technologies are responses to their available data, and not the situation at hand. Viewing the
technology as datanomous, rather than autonomous, makes explicit that it is not governed by a self, but by data. To exemplify, we will substitute the self with data in some
of the dimensions that characterize autonomy. Self-sufficient and self-directed becomes
data-sufficient and data-directed.
As we have noted above, the data on which the vacuum cleaner robot operates as
it moves around the home is very limited. The robot has no understanding of dust or
cleaning. It registers obstacles but does not distinguish between humans and furniture,
between cables and dirt, or between an apartment and the hallway of an apartment
building. Obstacles that cannot be handled result in a shift in direction. The robot also
does not register smaller things located on the floor, and may easily become stuck in
carpet frays or tangle itself in cables. Parallels can be drawn to a similar technology, the
robot lawn mower, a technology that also does not have any situational understanding
of what it is doing. It does not know about grass or gardens, and will not change its path
for small objects on the lawn before it is too late and the objects obstruct its operations
(Soma & Herstad, 2018; Verne, 2020).
Even in a less-than-ideal environment we may say that the users assisted the robot in
becoming data-sufficient by facilitating it in its operations. Similarly, a vacuum cleaner
robot is designed to navigate in a home environment, its cluttered nature means the
robot will always meet unpredictable situations, different from those it was created to
handle. Its data-sufficiency and data-directedness will always be limited by its data. The
robot is neither data-sufficient to carry out the navigation task when the environment
is unpredictable nor when it is not programmed to handle the myriad of furniture,
people, animals and other objects that can act as obstacles in the home.
Similarly, the smart insulin pump was designed for a very specific purpose, namely,
to adjust insulin levels based on the data it receives. If we limit the smart pump to responding to glucose measurements—a closed system—we can say that the smart pump
is indeed data-sufficient. The pump operates on the specific data with which it is trained
to interact, and responds with micro-doses of insulin if the glucose level measured in
Lisa’s body is too high. In this sense, the device is quite simple, and it is easy to see that
the scope of its data is limited, even if the insulin dosage calculations are complex and
inscrutable. The calculations include patterns of glucose oscillations over time, calibrating the model originally implemented in the device.
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However, if we widen the scope to include Lisa and her life, situations and contexts constantly change. The smart pump can never understand these. In the larger
perspective of her life, the pump is not data-sufficient. For instance, if Lisa attends an
event where cake is served, the pump will not know or understand this new situation;
it delivers insulin based only on historical data. As a general rule, Lisa can no longer
act preventively by increasing the dosage before the glucose level rises, as she could do
with her old device. This would provide wrong data that would lead to wrong calculations. Everyday use is also always training (Holmquist, 2017). The smart insulin pump
responds with insulin on continuous measurements of the body’s glucose level. It is not
a device with which you can negotiate.
ML-based systems improve over time. Their enhanced functioning and expansion
of their space for action come with the increased amounts of data providing a higher
resolution or granularity of data on which to base decisions. However, the datanomous technologies are still limited by their data compared to a human space for action,
where fundamentally new and unpredictable types of data can be incorporated into the
decision-making. Datanomous technology is based on existing classifications, making
the limits of classification systems important to acknowledge (Bowker & Star, 2008;
Broussard, 2018).
Datanomous technology interacts with humans through their data. There is often
a lack of interaction mechanisms for the human user to control the technology. This
means that the user of a datanomous technology is at the mercy of the designer’s understanding of a future and very specific use situation. Even ML-based technology is
framed by the original design of the algorithm and its data types, which forms the entire
basis of the decisions it makes.

5 Strengthening or weakening human autonomy
In this paper we have argued that human autonomy does not depend on controlling
the technology, per se. Human autonomy is instead correlated with understanding the
technology’s operations and requirements. People can choose to facilitate the environment to better fit the technology by improving the conditions for datanomy. In so
doing, they increase the chances that the datanomous technology operates as intended.
This, in turn, may strenghten human autonomy.
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5.1 Understanding rather than control strengthens human
autonomy
Throughout the paper, we have explained how knowledge of the datanomous technology and its data can be more important for human autonomy than direct control over
the technology. We have argued that the new concept, datanomous technology, captures
this insight. The knowledge of and ability to use a rather incomprehensible or imperceptible technology have to be based on trust that the technology functions as expected,
i.e., that its operations are correct and predictable. A user interacting with datanomous
technology gains experience with how it works. This experience can be used to explain
its behavor, if the technology consistently manages to fulfill the tasks it has been delegated. Users may further experience that the technology makes good choices for them
or assists them in making good choices for themselves. Giving away control to imperceptible technology can be compared to trusting a doctor’s expertise, and that the doctor’s advice is in a patient’s interest. Yet, it is important to note that trust in a technology
in reality means trusting the people who designed the technology, its algorithms, its
data and data types, its way of collecting new data, as well as those who worked with
the data (Muller et al., 2019). Similarly, when we are in need of medical treatment, we
trust the doctor prescribing treatment because we trust the institutions that guarentee
that this person is in fact a doctor with the necessary qualifications for treating you.
Being familiar with the data and algorithms in datanomous technologies gives the
user a better basis for choosing how to use the technology as well as how to relate—or
work—with that data and the datanomous environment (e.g., Haapoja & Lampinen,
2018). It is a paradox that having to do facilitation work before using the robot vacuum
cleaner can be seen as leading to more human autonomy, as it has the potential to teach
the human user about the limits and possibilities of the technology.
Technology that is imperceptible is often used in ways suggested by the technology,
such as following certain steps and applying default values. Systems that narrow the
decision space or try to nudge the user into a particular direction are often perceived as
patronizing or detrimental to subjective autonomy (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Nudging can be seen as hints to support the datanomy of the technology, and we argue that
this may also in fact lead to human autonomy, but in a different sense. Nudging is
particularly helpful when the user does not have the ability to make good choices for
himself, i.e., when systems are too complex and complicated or when the interaction is
so implicit that it is imperceptible, like many of the autonomous systems integrated in
public and private services. Having a higher number of choices does not automatically
lead to more autonomy (in particular, if you do not understand what they mean), just
as fewer choices do not necessarily lead to less autonomy. It is more complicated than
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this. Just like in the story about Odysseus, taking away your freedom of choice for a
limited time will not necessarily mean that you become less autonomous overall.
We have argued that people have limited knowledge of the technology and how
it works. Therefore they have to rely on their experiences from interacting with the
technology over time, for them to form a trusting relationship with it. This may not be
problematic when the technology is small and its scope limited, but in complex systems
with several smaller interdependent and interacting parts it becomes an impossible task
to gain an overview over the vast number of operations. Examples of such systems can
be found in government, health, infrastructure, and media. Individuals using or being
reliant on these kinds of systems cannot know whether they encounter all or just a part
of the system, nor which part. Even for skilled users, it will be impossible to gain an
overview over what is recognized as data by the system. Furthermore, it is impossible
to know exactly how this data is used, and for what purpose. In these cases, users will
not be able to know if they comply with the demands required by the system for it to
strengthen their autonomy and widen their space for action.
AI complicates the matter more. In a paper discussing how machines ‘think’, Burrell
(2016) argues that there are three forms of opacity in ML algorithms: 1) intentional, as
when a company wants to protect its product, 2) the technical illiteracy of their users,
and 3) the specific characteristics of ML algorithms “and the scale required to apply
them usefully” (Burrell, 2016, p. 1). Burrell is particularly concerned with “the mismatch between mathematical procedures of machine learning algorithms and human
styles of semantic interpretation” (Burrell, 2016, p. 3) referring to the layers of statistical analysis performed on data to calculate the probability of which category a piece
of registered data belongs to, as well as the process of yielding a conclusion from that
analysis. She illustrates her point with spam filters, which operate based on “a matrix of
weights that will then be used by the classifier to determine the classification for new
input data … for example … emails that have been pre-sorted and labeled as ‘spam’
or ‘not spam’” (Burrell, 2016, p. 5). She shows that the filter collects a ‘bag of words’
used for classification of emails as spam, which is different from a semantic analysis of
spam emails. As the number of words increases—as the ML learns from new data—the
granularity of the filter’s classification becomes finer and finer and more and more difficult to understand. “[I]ntuition fails at high-dimensions” (Domingos, 2012) of statistical analysis. “[R]easoning about, debugging, or improving the algorithm becomes
more difficult with more qualities or characteristics provided as inputs, each subtly and
imperceptibly shifting the resulting classification” (Burrell, 2016, p. 9). This imperceptibility into the inner workings of datanomous systems contradicts the possibility for
true Explainable AI.
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In making our argument we have described simple and limited autonomous systems
in which the user can directly see or sense the system’s operations. In these systems, it is
clear both what its data is and how that data is used in the system’s operations. In large
systems, however, composed of many smaller subsystems which interact with each other, comprehending the system’s operations becomes difficult. Concrete situations such
as Lisa’s case make the challenges to human autonomy from imperceptible technology accessible for scrutiny. For instance, human autonomy as a tenet within bioethics
points to the right of the individual to decide whether or not receive medical treatment
(Floridi et al., 2018). In Lisa’s case, it is possible to evaluate whether she is truly able to
consent to the treatment given by the pump. The pump’s workings become increasingly
opaque as its algorithms adjust themselves to the data they register about her insulin
regulation needs. The fact that the pump is a small, manageable, isolated system, and
that Lisa can identify the effects of her behaviour on the system and the system’s developmental response (e.g., that she needs to provide the system with correct data),
allows for an evaluation of her autonomy when using the datanomous technology and
the treatment it provides her on a personal level. However, the complexity rises at an
organisational level comprised of many different situations, all with their particular
contextual relations constituting the human autonomy. It therefore becomes next to
impossible to assess (in a general way) the effects of a large system on human autonomy. Yet another layer of complexity arises whenever systems ‘learn’ and change the data
on which they operate over time, with these changes originating from data processing
(Burrell, 2016) rather than a context understandable to a human user.
We have argued that when humans understand the data, it is possible for them to
choose how to use the datanomous system in a manner that strengthens their individual
autonomy. If the data is opaque, this possibility is reduced, and the larger system operates with the datanomous system as its core, rather than strengthening the human-incontext. Human autonomy and machine datanomy are not mutually exclusive, i.e.,
humans do not automatically gain or lose autonomy when datanomous technologies
are implemented. Still, it is important to remember that humans and machines are
radically different when it comes to their possibilities of being morally and legally responsible for their actions (Soltanzadeh, 2021). If, when and how, and for what the
technology is used, determines whether human autonomy is weakened or strengthened.

5.2 The activity creates a context for datanomy
In discussions concerning whether an activity or a task is better delegated to a datanomous technology or not, we need to examine the nature (which can be either instru-
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mental or constitutive) of the activity and the role (either epistemic or logical) of human
engagement (Soltanzadeh, 2021). In activities where it does not matter who performs
the activity or how it is completed, such as driving between work and home, the activity
can successfully be delegated to a driver or a self-driving vehicle. However, people also
perform activities for which the value of the activity is in the engagement itself (Carr,
2015). Examples are abundant, like participating in a play, playing a game, engaging
in religious acts, or listening to music, to name a few. Whenever the desire is to engage
in such activities for the sake of engagement, these specific activities cannot logically be
delegated to others, neither human nor machines. Driving cannot be delegated to another driver or a self-driving car if the goal of the driver is recreational. When engaged
in leisurely driving, what constitutes a good, relaxing, pleasant, or exciting drive can
only be evaluated by the individual. This way of driving cannot be planned in detail
and depends on a series of personal, momentary decisions, and it is therefore neither
logically nor epistemically possible for a datanomous technology to be delegated this
activity. What further complicates the matter, is that when merely observing someone
drive, it may be impossible to decide whether the driver is constitutively engaged in leisurely driving, or merely driving to reach the instrumental goal of arriving somewhere.
It may even be both.
This distinction can be used to discuss both the robot vacuum cleaner and the smart
insulin pump. At first glance, removing dust—when the successful result can be evaluated by a clean floor—is obviously an instrumental task and can therefore be delegated to a robot. Hence, it would be within reason to claim that this type of activity
can be delegated to a datanomous technology, which it has been. However, for some
people, the act of contributing to a tidy and clean home may be—in itself—satisfying
(Christiansen & Andersen, 2013). In such a case, value can be found in the experience
of performing cleaning activities. Since delegating the task of removing dust can be
delegated to a robot, it needs facilitation to be successful in achieving this instrumental
goal, and a person could still be engaged in the cleaning activities even if the physical
dust collection is not one of them.
The smart pump is more complex. The device is developed to deliver a specific and
measurable result: a correct insulin dose to the body. However, it is important that this
does not eclipse the fact that living with the pump is a personal experience, whereby the
overall goal of coping with diabetes can be considered a value. A well-functioning smart
pump will make living with diabetes—performing insulin managing activities—easier.
It is still worth noting, however, that the active management type of activity is transformed into an instrumental activity when performed by the pump rather than Lisa
herself. Without judging what is better or more desired, we find that the competence
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Lisa had as an active manager of her diabetes—keeping track of the effects of the insulin
dosages—may disappear as the management has been delegated to the datanomous and
black-boxed technology. Still, Lisa has ended up very satisfied with her new device. Like
Odysseus, she gained a new kind of freedom by delegating the management of diabetes
to the smart pump. Even if the pump in some ways controls her life, she worries less
about her health.
In light of this, it may be worthwhile to ask if there are any activities that may,
over time, have unforeseen societal effects—for worse or better, for a strengthened or
weakened human autonomy—of forcing a transformation of constitutive activities into
instrumental ones. Consider activities that are not obviously constitutive, because they
are industrious and exhausting, or dull and repetitive, yet could also be considered
valuable, such as caring for children or elders. In the case of the smart pump, the
knowledge of routine management of diabetes may be lost over time when Lisa no
longer must—or can—control the pump. Delegating boring routines to automation
may result in loss of knowledge about these routines, making it difficult or even impossible to handle non-routine situations or crises (Bainbridge, 1983; Xu, 2021). In
delegating routine parts of a task to automation the person in charge of facilitation and
articulation work could end up without any control over the quality of this automated
task. Therefore, it only makes sense to use automation in activities that are possible to
describe in steps of objectively identifiable results (Soltanzadeh, 2021). Otherwise, the
process of automating the activity necessitates its redefinition. For instance, when the
activity of ‘looking after’ a patient is delegated to monitoring sensors and cameras, the
aspect of ‘care’ is completely severed (Bratteteig & Wagner, 2013). Automation does
not contain discretion or care and should not be used whenever these qualities are an
important aspect of the activities.
We ended section 3.1 by stating that if, when and how, and for what the technology is used, determines whether human autonomy is weakened or strengthened. This
fits well with Dignum’s (2018) insight about the role of values in protecting human
rights, emphasizing that values depend on the socio-cultural context in which they are
adopted; the individuals adopting them; and how they are prioritized. Organizations
are made up of individuals; it is individuals who carry out tasks and make decisions and
realize values in practice. The goal of every activity therefore becomes closely tied to ethics, legislation, and responsibility—including when technology is part of that activity
(e.g., Mikalef et al., 2022). The responsible organization facilitates the individuals’ possibilities for acting responsibly, also when the activity includes datanomous technology.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have explored whether datanomous technologies can strenghten human
autonomy. We have described human autonomy as the space for action in a situation,
i.e., the capacity to act according to one own’s values and wishes utilizing the resources
in the situation. Human autonomy is relational and situated. We introduced the notion
of datanomous technology to denote technology that acts in a way that is interpreted as
autonomous. The concept datanomous emphasizes the role of data as the basis for the
actions that the technology is capable of, and that even if new data is included in the
decision-making, the data types limit its space for action. Datanomous technology is
not able to add data types or redefine its model beyond an increased resolution.
Based on the exploration of the notion of autonomy above we can arrive at a better
understanding of our use of the notion for humans and technology. Human autonomy
has to do with people’s ability to manipulate their space for action. In knowing about
possible actions, understanding how to generate different possibilities by making use
of the available resources, the space for action can be altered. In the case of Lisa and
her smart insulin pump, we saw that even if she has given up understanding and controlling the device, she still feels that it enhances her autonomy. In the case of the robot
vacuum cleaner, we saw that even if the users carried out a lot of facilitation to make it
work, they still interpreted it as ‘autonomous’ technology that helped them with their
cleaning activities. Technology—whether datanomous or not—obviously can become
a part of human autonomy.
We have discussed the concept of autonomy by specifying what it means, arriving at
an understanding of ‘autonomy’ that is best described as containing a multitude of dimensions rather than a spectrum. We have argued that ‘autonomy’ is not a characterization, feature or property, but better understood as a condition or state of being. The fact
that autonomy is often used as a characterization (for both humans and machines), has
contributed to its meaning becoming confused. In our understanding of the concept,
the most important dimension of autonomy is an individual’s space for action, which
frames the ability a person has to create new choices for themselves. This is of particular
importance, as every situation is unique and impossible to predict in detail. Creating
new possibilities, and choosing between them, requires knowledge of the choices that
also can form the basis for imagining novel choices.
Our discussion of how datanomous technology affects human autonomy emphasized that knowledge of the system and the data was necessary for the human to utilize
and trust the technology, even if this meant facilitating the environment to be more
technology-friendly. Not understanding the technology, or even knowing that the data
eliminates choices, reduces the space for action for the human user.
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Working with the concept revealed a need for more specificity about the differences
in autonomy between humans and machines. The difference becomes visible when we
examine their respective spaces for action. The space for action of autonomous technology is limited by the processing abilities of the technology and the data types that the
data gathering equipment is able to register and process. In light of this, datanomous
technology becomes a more precise concept. Human space for action is characterized by
the ability to include fundamentally new types of data and actions into consideration,
and to redefine a situation in profound ways. The incremental steps that a ML makes by
adding new data to redefine its computing does not include the possibility of the kind
of large and fundamental reconfigurations that a human can perform.
Datanomous technology can be part of the contextually situated resources that support human autonomy, but can also delimit human autonomy by reducing the human
space for action. It is the purpose of the activity, instrumental or constitutive, that determines if automation strengthens or weakens human autonomy. If the purpose of the
activity is an objective result, it is instrumental; if performing the activity is what gives it
meaning, it is constitutive. An activity may change its purpose, and hence the human’s
role in it, if automation—or datanomos technology—is introduced.
Our exploration of the meanings of autonomy point to what is important for human autonomy: the type of activity and the space for action. In reference to responsible
AI, it also points to what is important for design of datanomous technology for the autonomous human. Being aware of the central role of the data types for the technology,
its limits and possibilities cease to be imperceptible. Thus, the human space for action
can be expanded by datanomous technology.
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Notes
1.

2.

The background for the robot vacuum cleaner example is a collection of empirical studies
of robots in the wild, e.g., in non-lab settings, such as homes and gardens. In 2018-2020
we observed and interviewed 50 users of the robot vacuum cleaners iRobot Roomba and
Neato from Neato Robotics about their experiences. These experiences were presented and
discussed in a couple of studies, including critical reflections with regard to the ethical
dilemmas of using such connected devices (see Saplacan et al., 2021; Saplacan, Herstad, &
Pajalic, 2020b; Saplacan, Herstad, Tørresen, et al., 2020; Saplacan & Herstad, 2019). Our
studies confirmed and supplemented other studies of everyday technologies in the home
The example of Lisa and her new insulin pump are part of a study presented in Schimmer
(2021), where individuals with type 2 diabetes share their experience of living with diabetes.
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